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Introduction
The aerospace industry is dependent upon safety for success. Without
predictably safe operations, aviation travel would lack the trust and confidence of
the public, causing revenue reductions, discontinued passenger routes, and
cessation of some ancillary services. Aviation safety management systems (SMS)
are tools that the industry uses to establish and maintain safety, predicting
weaknesses and implementing remedial actions. SMS rely on an organizational
culture of error reporting and safety-related processes that pervade every facet of
planning, operations, and business structure all operating within a non-punitive
atmosphere called a just culture (Darveau & Hannon, 2017; Dekker, 2014; Reason,
1990).
Establishing the proper organizational culture is a prerequisite for a working
SMS (Dekker, 2014). Building or remodeling company culture can be hindered by
obstacles. There are human biases within every company that act as barriers to the
establishment of the type of culture that supports the systemic implementation that
SMS requires. These biases act as influential factors on the SMS, limiting its
effectiveness.
Background
Human biases can be overt and discriminatory, acting as illegal and socially
unacceptable barriers to the foundation of safety culture (Jones, Arena, Nittrouer,
Alonso, & Lindsey, 2017). Other biases can be subtle, resulting from cognitive
evolutionary processes evolving over many thousands of years (Jones et al., 2017).
These subconscious biases are thinking accelerators acting on human cognitive
reflexes (Howard, 2017) being referred to as “system 1” type thinking, based on
impulse and habit mechanisms devoid of most logical thought patterns (Liu, Vlesy,
Fang, Denrell, & Chater, 2017).
Traditional solutions for dealing with human biases have included both
education and recognition (Liu et al., 2017). These types of coping tools engage
logical thought and have proven to have limitations (Derous, Buijsrogge, Roulin,
& Duvck, 2016). This position paper offers an alternative method for engaging
human bias and evaluates the potential of system 1 type thinking in dealing with
system 1 type biases, improving the success of organizational culture necessary for
SMS to flourish. This paper studies the application of a system called
MINDSPACE (Liu et al., 2017) during the process of establishing company just
culture.
Most traditional interventions against human biases employ logical thought
and reflection, which are considered “system 2” thinking. Reducing human biases
with “fight fire with fire” approach, matching system 1 solutions against reflexive
biases in an aviation context, is the purpose of this paper (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Differences between system 1 and system 2 thinking in humans.
Reprinted from ‘The pseudo-nuero science of business thinking…fast or slow, left
or right, logic or emotion, system 1 or 2.’ Retrieved from
https://www.thegeniusworks.com/2017/05/the-pseudo-neuro-science-of-businessthinking-fast-or-slow-left-or-right-logic-and-emotion/. Copyright 2017 by Peter
Fisk.
Current research has identified human biases as leading obstacles to
efficient SMS function (Darveau & Hannon, 2017; Jausan, Silva, & Sabatini, 2017;
Liu et al., 2017). Human biases often work contrary to corporate efforts intent on
establishing cultures boosting SMS potency (Baybutt, 2016; Bellamy, Chambon,
& Guldener, 2018; Derous et al., 2016; Emmons, Mazzuchi, Sarkani, & Larsen,
2018; Gubbins, Harney, Vanderwerff, & Rosseau, 2018). Reducing the overall
impact of these biases on the development of organizational safety culture with
modern alternatives is the purpose of this paper.
Organizational culture is the fertile ground that permits SMS to be effective.
Culture allows the establishment of the four pillars of SMS which are safety policy,
risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016).
Establishing a culture that is open to and dedicated to developing these four safety
concepts in the most primary step in the effective function of SMS.
Statement of the Problem
Establishing a safety culture at the organizational level involves a
commitment from the top leadership, appointment of a safety advocate, and
adoption by upper- and mid-level divisional managers (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016).
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The problem is that human biases interfere with the establishment of culture, the
primary step in establishing an effective SMS.
Mitigating human bias in real-world situations remains elusive, despite a
saturation of research on human bias and its negative consequences on
organizational efficiencies (Liu et al., 2017). The current body of research related
to human biases supports the relationship of systemic bias with the presence of
organizational barriers impeding the performance of SMS (Jausan et al., 2017).
Research identified four predominant human biases called anchoring bias,
optimism bias, planning fallacy bias, and ambiguity bias (Emmons et al., 2018).
Given the limitations of traditional strategies to effectively counter human biases,
the MINDSPACE alternative system was evaluated to ascertain its potential impact
to confront these four biases within the context of organizational decision making
specifically related to establishing and maintaining a just culture.
Review of the Relevant Literature
History of Safety Management Systems
SMS are active within various industries. Many types of SMS have emerged
within transportation industries to identify, manage, and preclude accidents
(Naevestad & Hesjevoll, 2018; Ranney et al., 2018). The majority of SMS share
certain characteristics in that they are structured, actively managed systems
supported by leadership, designed to control risks, and prevent accidents (Li &
Guldenmund, 2018).
Aviation SMSs began to evolve from the developed structure of quality
management systems (QMS) emerging from mature businesses in the 1960s.
Quality management has been a focus for goods manufacturers and proprietors for
millennia, but the organized QMS emphasis on planning and building a quality
system with repeatable processes along with measuring performance is considered
the basis for modern aviation SMS systems (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016). Aviation
SMS were developed over time as technical improvements combined with human
factors studies and business-related QMS programs began to influence an organized
approach to aviation safety (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2016).
Purpose of the Aviation SMS
Aviation SMS success requires the identification of hazards, potential
hazards, and management of risk. The FAA defines a SMS as “the formal, topdown, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the
effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices,
and policies for the management of safety risk” (2018, para. 1). The aviation SMS
is a decision-making tool that is reactive and proactive in eliminating known and
unknown risks, supported within an organizational culture that facilitates error
reporting, dedicated to the continuing discovery of hazards (Dekker, 2014; Stolzer
& Goglia, 2016).
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There are four fundamental, structural elements of an aviation SMS: safety
policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion (Stolzer &
Goglia, 2016). Each pillar of SMS may support sub-systems which can enhance
effectiveness. The four elements are introduced below (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. The four main components of an aviation safety management system.
Reprinted from (FAA, n.d). Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/about/
initiatives/sms/explained/components/
Safety policy refers to the dedication by upper levels of management to
provide a “just” culture in which unintentional mistakes are not punishable and
error reporting becomes normal behavior. The just culture is a primary requirement
for SMS to function properly because it provides objective information about root
causes for mistakes which aid ongoing efforts to identify hazards and interrupt them.
Barriers that prevent the establishment of a just culture will reduce the effectiveness
of an aviation SMS (Baybutt, 2016; Bellamy et al., 2018; Darveau & Hannon, 2017;
Dekker, 2014; Emmons et al., 2018).
Safety risk management is the second pillar of SMS and is related to the
processes of hazard identification, risk identification and mitigation of both. Each
company will have its own safety objectives, along with operational and financial
constraints. This means that every safety risk management program for each
aviation SMS will be structured differently. These risk management programs
should not be thought of as pattern-type systems and each SMS must be evaluated
and its performance measured on its own merits (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016).
Safety assurance is the third pillar of SMS and involves the actions
necessary to verify that established hazard identification and risk management tools
are acting effectively (Waddington, Lafortune, & Duffey, 2009). This part of a SMS
deals with internal and external auditing, data collection, and performance
measuring. A critical element of safety assurance is the constant inflow of objective
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error reporting data submitted through voluntary reporting systems (VRSs)
(Robertson, 2016). Safety assurance is an important SMS function as it verifies that
risks are being identified, mitigated and controlled.
Safety promotion is the final element of an SMS and is related to the topdown management support of culture, safety education and mode of information
sharing. Safety promotion also informs employees about the success of recent
safety efforts to include the effectiveness of VRSs (Stolzer & Goglia, 2016).
System 1 Versus System 2 Thinking
It is important to clarify the differences between system 1 and system 2
thought processes since both are used as tools for reducing human biases. System
1 thinking is impulse and habitually driven while system 2 deliberations are more
logical and determined (Derous et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017). A system 1 bias
example would involve an internal feeling of positive kinship between an applicant
review board panelist and a job interviewee that comes from a similar educational,
vocational, or geographical background. Given the same example, a system 2
response would be to ignore those feelings of camaraderie and focus on written
checklist tools, analysis processes, and performance-based criterion for judging
purposes.
Methodology
Research Approach
This research was conducted as a comprehensive literature review to
determine the extent of scholarly research involving human bias and how biases
may impact the effectiveness of SMS. The research included the goal of discovering
the most common barriers to an effective safety system, noting that most of these
impediments included human bias in some form. All parts of the SMS were
considered to include the safety culture, safety policy, safety risk management,
safety assurance, and safety promotion.
Design and Procedures
Numerous scholarly, peer-reviewed databases were consulted, emphasizing
publications within the past three years. The systemic literature review resulted in
the initial consideration of 86 sources, with the final source data emanating from
references on human biases, organizational barriers, and remedies for counteracting
biases having an impact on SMS effectiveness.
Treatment of the Data
Survey data from multiple sources were collected regarding barriers to SMS
effectiveness. The overall goal was identification of common themes in the data
that represented the most common barriers to SMS effectiveness as recognized by
transportation industry experts. This was accomplished by assigning barriers into
categories. The categories were organizational, individual, and working
environment. Sixty-two different barriers to SMS were identified across five
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studies. There were 29 organizational barriers, 18 individual barriers, and 23
working environment barriers identified across all studies identified within the
literature. Four barriers were included in all categories because they describe
human biases that are applicable in some form across all types of organizational
structures. As a result of organizational influences on safety culture, an emphasis
on organizational barriers to SMS was chosen (Li & Guldenmund, 2018).
Results
The results from the literature review and subsequent data analysis revealed
that human biases are systemic in the workplace. Within the aviation industry,
human biases at the organizational level were discovered to have the most negative
impact on establishing a just culture in which an SMS can effectively operate. The
results also suggested that there are four biases that are predominant in propagating
breakdowns in SMS effectiveness: optimism bias, planning fallacy bias, anchoring
bias, and ambiguity bias. Results indicated that potentialities exist for deploying
system 1 cognitive solutions within aviation businesses to combat human biases
and strengthen the establishment of a strong just culture. The results also suggested
that custom designed solutions may include both system 1 and system 2 approaches.
Finally, the existence of a strong entrepreneurial culture may serve to inhibit the
establishment of a safety just culture, especially if the owner(s) do not recognize
the biases evident in their decision-making.
Organizational Barriers are Important
Human biases at the organizational level were shown in the research to
impact SMS effectiveness by impeding the establishment of a just culture (Darveau
& Hammond, 2017; Emmons et al., 2018; Ioannou et al., 2017; Jausan et al., 2017;
Naevestad et al., 2018). A just culture requires an objective corporate mindset intent
on constructing an atmosphere of trust which fosters voluntary error reporting
(Darveau & Hammond, 2017). The data showed that when human biases are
permitted to exist, or are used in decision-making, certain vulnerabilities in a just
culture can be created. Some of these weaknesses are managerial self-protection
mechanisms, protection of status, overconfidence, overt discrimination, and
resistance to change (Baybutt, 2016; Bellamy et al., 2018; Dekker, 2014; Derous et
al., 2016; Howard 2017). Moreover, since these biases exist at the organizational
level and due to their negative impact on the development of a just culture, biases
must be recognized, managed, and controlled.
Two general schools of thought emerged within the research aimed at
reducing optimism bias, planning fallacy bias, anchoring bias, and ambiguity bias
at the organizational level: system 1 and system 2 based cognitive solutions.
Traditional Solutions are Ineffective
Liu et al. (2017) noted the ineffectiveness of standalone system 2 cognitive
solutions. System 2 thinking seeks to recognize that human biases exist and “de-
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bias” the decision-making process (p. 135). Liu et al. argued that system 2 solutions
attempt to rationalize instinctual, rapid impulse decision-making (system 1), and is
therefore not compatible with strategizing solutions to system 1 biases.
The entirety of the data included in this report also supported the concept
that the sole use of system 2 cognitive tools aimed at reducing human biases is not
effective. Prima facia evidence for this conclusion abounds since there is evidence
that despite the deployment of system 2 tools, human biases remain pervasive
(Jones et al., 2017; Malos, 2015).
MINDSPACE – A New Framework
The MINDSPACE framework offers relatively new potential for managing
human biases. MINDSPACE seeks to motivate human behavior by altering the
context of the decision-making process so that system 1 cognition is more aligned
with organizational culture (Liu et al., 2017). This is accomplished by “using one
bias to overcome another bias” versus “changing the mind” (pp. 136-137).
MINDSPACE attempts to motivate human behavior by manipulating responses to
impulsive and habitual cognitive reflexes.
The MINDSPACE system is based on a book called The Nudge and was
originally proposed by Dolan et al. (2010) to the government of the United
Kingdom in analyzing how governmental policy changes may impact human
behavior. Since that time, use of the MINDSPACE approach has widened,
spreading into pharmacological (O’Sullivan, Ryan, Downey, & Hughes, 2016),
healthcare (Vlaev, King, Dolan, & Darzi, 2016), and industrial settings (Liu et al.,
2017). Based on its continued success and adoption by other industries,
MINDSPACE shows promise for aviation applications.
The MINDSPACE nine system 1 interventions and brief explanations are
shown below:
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Table 1
MINDSPACE Acronym and Definitions
(M) Messenger
People are influenced by who communicates
information
(I) Incentives
Human beings have mental shortcuts to prevent “losses”
(N) Norms
People are strongly influenced by what others do and
what is considered normal behavior
(D) Defaults
People tend to stick with pre-determined options
(S) Salience
What is unique and relevant draws human attention
(P) Priming
Human behavior is influenced by “subconscious cues”
(A) Affect
Emotional associations can be powerful human
motivators
(C) Commitments
We honor public commitments and tend to reciprocate
acts
(E) Ego
Humans act in ways that protect, preserve the self
Note. Adapted from Dolan et al., (2010). MINDSPACE: Influencing Behavior
Through Public Policy, p. 6.
The core element of the MINDSPACE approach is that it uses one of, or a
combination of, the above nine interventions to alter the context of the decisionmaking process to align system 1 solutions with system 1 type problems (associated
with human biases in this case).
MINDSPACE can benefit companies aiming to establish just cultures as a
basis of effective SMS. Strategizing with MINDSPACE may be both creative and
scientific processes, with final solutions aimed at initial corporate and internal error
reactionary measures being more about safety, efficiency, and performance, rather
than punishment.
Each of the MINDSPACE interventions are listed below, but only briefly.
They are shown in italics when referencing a specific MINDSPACE letter. The
reader should use this basic information to further their knowledge about
MINDSPACE and system 1 interventions, especially within aviation applications.
Messenger
People attach meaning to information disseminated by those that are
considered experts of knowledgeable. The messages often act as an anchor,
especially when listeners may not be well-versed about a particular subject. The
significance of the messenger within the context of MINDSPACE is that the
message may be manipulated to achieve the desired human behavior. If objectivity
is crucial, then anonymity should be promoted and only the message itself delivered.
In establishing a just culture at the organizational level, messengers have significant
influence over the strength of the overall impact of the efforts (Dolan et al., 2010).
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Incentives
Most human beings will go to great lengths to avoid financial and or social
losses. Incentives is a powerful MINDSPACE interdiction as it allows planning
around many of the shared characteristics that the aviation industry shares with
other business segments: competition, product and services promotion, business
health and success, personal career growth, and other factors. Planners may utilize
this “fear of losses” to guide thinking to more closely parallel organizational goals.
This intervention may assist company leaders with establishing just cultures
because most people tend to avoid punishment and reciprocate respectful behavior
(Dekker, 2014).
Norms
Most people do not enjoy being categorized as outside of being “normal.”
Past research has indicated that people will go to great lengths in avoiding being
labelled as abnormal or existing outside of normal behavior.
The use of norms can be a powerful tool when establishing a safety culture.
This strategy may act as a leverage point (and combine with other MINDSPACE
interventions) for top leadership to persuade mid-level managers to accept the new
culture and support it. Another possibility is to establish teams of employees across
all operational divisions that can participate, contributing ideas to culture
development but through a well-designed input mechanism intended to elicit
acceptance of the final product. This would also involve the use of commitments,
the C in the MINDSPACE framework. The planned participation of all employees
signals management’s readiness for across the board input, engaging in “normal”
face to face interactions and a new way of doing business (Liu et al., 2017).
Defaults
People do not enjoy changing selections, especially when it involves
possible losses. Organizational leaders should utilize MINDSPACE to establish
culture-related default policies that encourage adoption of just cultures. This may
involve establishing internal, decision-making roadmaps that require a certain
number of managers agree (or disagree) on a topic. This process then becomes the
default way of making decisions throughout the organization.
Utilizing defaults to enhance aviation just cultures can include many things
such as using automatic generation of anonymous user accounts for VRS log in as
part of the onboarding process for new employees. This default setting allows
everyone within the organization to have an anonymous account, followed up by
human resources’s training on the use of and effectiveness of VRSs. Within the
organization, other default policies are available and may include pilot and crew
shuttles that utilize hotels without all- night clubs attached (to reduce temptations
to drink alcohol late in the evening). The ideas are limitless, involve changing the
context (not the mind) and involve specific organizational goals.
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Salience
Salience is a MINDSPACE intervention that acts on a human being’s
evolutionary impulse to anchor information. Salience makes us choose things
because they are deemed important or critical to a process or simply because the
object, idea or policy is more noticeable and available. An example of salience is
the successful increased sales of milk versus soda in a cafeteria due to milk being
placed more directly in front of young consumers and soda being placed farther
away. This is the concept of salience.
Salience can be useful in establishing just cultures when strategists use it to
manipulate influences to overcome established or “old” ways of doing things.
While the traditional punishment for errors may be monetary, a reprimand or even
employment termination, salience keeps the focus on the determination of root
causes and determination of hazards (Liu et al., 2017).
Priming
Priming means that as people, we often base our decision-making on
subconscious ques that are beyond the scope of the issue at hand. Despite having
years of experience in human biases, judges have higher conviction rates when the
weather is bad. This type of system 1 process is difficult to correct because even if
identification of such behavior is available in research, it still exists and recorded
as systemic.
Priming may impact the establishment of just cultures by encouraging
leadership to respond negatively to any policy changes resulting in a loss of income
(this could also be part of incentives). To counter priming and encourage acceptance
of the just culture, the context of the situation could be altered to show the benefits
to the company’s competitiveness and attractiveness toward previously
unidentified market segments. By altering the context way from finances, the focus
is shifted toward stability and potential growth (Jones et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017).
Affect
Affect involves human emotions. Results that have negative emotional
impact tend to be avoided. The FAA recognizes the impact that affect has on new
students undergoing flight training. In the Aviation Instructor’s Handbook, the
FAA discusses the Law of Effect: “Thus, learning is strengthened when
accompanied by a pleasant or satisfying feeling, and (sic) weakened when
associated with an unpleasant feeling” (FAA, 2008, p. 2-11).
Affect is a core argument against punishing accidental errors. Internal
policies should reflect as much positive emotional support and reaction as possible
when establishing just cultures, especially if there is a transition necessary to
achieve it. Moving from the traditional ways of “doing things around here” to a
vibrant, forward thinking just culture may create negative emotional responses
from some. There should be a strategy to guide and manage those feelings.
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Commitments
People normally honor public commitments and reciprocate good behavior
(Liu et al., 2017). Strategist for just culture development should note that
commitment becomes even more successful when costs of failure becomes elevated
(Dolan et al., 2010). In developing just culture, it is important to obtain firm
commitments from messengers and other managers to support and promote the
changes. Public commitments to the just culture would be most effective, especially
when linking the lack of commitments to loss (as in a loss of business to a
competitor).
Ego
Ego means that people act in ways that tend to elevate themselves. Ego is a
complex subject, as the term also includes ancillary situations and conditions with
which the ego interacts. People contemplate their own behavior and performance
as being superior to others, when the opposite may be true. Ego is a powerful
heuristic that may be combined with other MINDSPACE interventions to create
novel solutions. Ego may be problematic when establishing a just culture that
enhances SMS effectiveness. To counter ego, the context must be changed so that
ego is acted “with” in developing solutions to just culture implementation (Dolan
et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017). An example of utilizing ego to organizational
advantage would be to recognize work efforts based on their contribution to the
culture, rather than their personal achievements.
MINDSPACE and Optimism Bias
Optimism bias can reduce an organization’s attempts at establishing the just
culture necessary for an effective SMS. Optimism bias creates the illusion that one
is at a reduced risk of experiencing and having to deal with the consequences of a
negative event, compared to peers. When CEOs and upper level managers are
influenced by this bias, they may propagate that invulnerability into the culture
planning process, assuming that existing risk identification and management
programs are effective “enough” (Emmons et al., 2018). Optimism bias may be
strengthened by a clean accident record and result in dangerous complacency.
Optimism bias may influence corporate leaders to skip safety meetings and
participation in safety-related activities. Crafting a custom MINDSPACE approach
against optimism bias would depend on the details of each situation. In general,
leaders must be “obsessed” with safety in such a way that it becomes the norm for
the organization (National Transportation Safety Board, 2013).
Another MINDSPACE approach to counter optimism bias is to engage in
“devil’s advocate” (Baybutt, 2016) type behavior, highlighting the potential for
realistic personal losses (paychecks), damage to corporate reputation (stability of
the company), and questioning of leadership (stability of management) occurring
as the result of accidents and poor safety culture. By highlighting the possible
methods and consequences of failure, system 1 thinking is engaged via realization
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that this behavior is outside of safety “norms: and providing “incentives” to avoid
personal and financial losses.
It is important when utilizing MINDPACE as a tool to combat biases, that
exaggeration be avoided so that participants do not evaluate the system as a “scare
tactic” or extreme measure. Company-wide, management accepted goals should be
evaluated for MINDSPACE solutions with real-word, believable outcomes that
build trust in the MINDSPACE system because it is aligned with overall
organizational goals.
Engaging MINDSPACE to minimize optimism bias when establishing (and
maintaining) a just culture means having a system 1 program in place to
consistently remind culture designers that the company is statistically vulnerable to
negative events. This understanding should be the catalyst for healthy and more
ingenious hazard and risk analyses and mitigation measures during the
establishment of just culture itself. MINDSPACE recognizes that there are inherent
hazards and risks in the establishment of potential solutions in that the answers are
susceptible to biases in design, construction and implementation.
MINDSPACE and Planning Fallacy Bias
Planning fallacy bias involves underestimating resources required while
overestimating the benefits (Emmons et al., 2018). When the task is establishing a
just culture, planning fallacy may have deeply negative consequences for longerterm SMS effectiveness. For example, consider that leadership is working to
establish a VRS as part of a non-punitive just culture that proactively encourages
error disclosures. If a strong message is not broadcast from the CEO (the
messenger), the promotion of safety is seen as delicate and ethereal. The
unquestionable dedication of leadership to the establishment of just culture is
paramount because it acts on the instinctive reflex to believe or not to believe the
messenger, the head of the company (a system 1 process).
To support the establishment of a just culture and to aid in combating
planning fallacy, organizations should consider establishing working teams to
default to a risk adverse position automatically. For example, if a helicopter work
crew is working on a live electrical conductor, any member of the crew should have
the authority to stop the entire work process at any time and discuss the issues with
no penalties in benefits (pay or working hours). This default to safety represents
support of the just culture from an organizational level and builds trustworthiness
with employees that “safety is the norm.” Use of the default mitigation tool also
assists in alleviating the planning fallacy bias by recognizing the error in resources
allocation and effectiveness of procedures, even if it is during a work process.
MINSPACE and Anchoring Bias
Anchoring bias causes people to base conclusions on certain data points that
may be factual or non-factual or on previous experiences (Darveau & Hammond,
2017). These anchors can form as a result of a messenger (individual or company
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policy), partial information, or a static culture that promotes the idea of circular
logic like this is the way we have always done it around here and if it’s not broken,
don’t fix it. Baybutt (2016) noted that anchoring may lead to a type of group or herd
mentality that precludes innovation and organizational improvement.
For aviation companies, anchoring bias can result in complacency that is a
key enemy, impacting safety and profitability at the same time (Darveau &
Hammond, 2017). Sometimes, the anchoring can result from a lack of information.
In these particular cases, a system 1 approach to combat anchoring would be to
develop systems through which intelligence is gained about competition. This
information about competitors would provide a steady stream of new information
which would combat anchoring bias and would act on the system 1 cognitive reflex
to “protect” corporate homeland and its customers (incentives, salience, ego)
(Dolan et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017).
Although the topic could be mentioned in other sections of this report, the
discussion about anchoring bias seems an appropriate time to mention the strong
influence of entrepreneurs. Small to mid-sized companies can be especially
vulnerable to the strong leadership styles of entrepreneurs who may bypass normal,
internal company processes established to guarantee best case business practices.
This strong anchoring effect can lead others in leadership positions to accept this
influence and make allowances that retard safety and the establishment of a just
culture.
An example of entrepreneurial influence on a just culture would occur if a
business owner directly hires a friend in a safety-sensitive position, bypassing
normal hiring defaults and processes. An entrepreneur sought to limit safety
oversight through a political connection in 1995, which resulted in a charter plane
crash, killing three doctors (Brasher, 1995). Since aviation entrepreneurs have legal
powers as business owners, they can be dangerous catalysts for excessive risktaking and just culture failures.
MINDSPACE and Ambiguity Bias
Ambiguity bias (or effect) is related to the identification of “high
consequence, low probability” events that are beyond a decision-maker’s control
or breadth of knowledge (Emmons et al., 2018, p. 64). Ambiguity bias occurs when
decisions are made on limited data in favor of known probabilities for favorable
outcomes. People tend to avoid choosing an outcome that has limited information.
Employees will tend to ignore, or refuse to participate in just cultures with
complicated policies or systems, choosing the status quo over a new, more
ambiguous method of operations.
Impeding ambiguity when setting up just cultures can be facilitated with use
of the MINDSPACE intervention strategies. The key to the ambiguity bias is clarity
and clarity demands information. Just cultures should have clear, well-explained
policies that treat participants equally and are transparent. Voluntary reporting
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systems (VRSs) should be anonymous and thoroughly explained from system
architecture to collection of data and final disposition of reports. Strategists may
choose any number of MINDSPACE combinations to achieve these outcomes.
When combatting ambiguity bias, it may be especially useful to maintain a
high level of transparency in order to facilitate trust in the just culture. The use of
messengers and incentives could accomplish transparency by providing feedback
about every VRS error report. The emphasis on positive outcomes for VRS
reporting would also provide salience to just culture operations by reinforcing trust
by providing transparency and real-life corporate benefits to just culture
implementation. Scheduling different members of management and labor discuss
these outcomes would also provide an element of ego, further reinforcing adoption
of non-punitive thinking.
Conclusions
Systemic human biases impede objective decision-making at organizational
levels, acting as barriers to establishing just cultures. The most common human
biases at the organizational level identified in this research were optimism bias,
planning bias, planning fallacy bias, and ambiguity bias. Various strategies exist
for managing biases that act as barriers to just culture, a pre-requisite for effective
aviation SMSs. Two different approaches are normally referenced when dealing
with the impact of human biases: system 1 and system 2 solutions.
System 1 solutions are countering mechanisms that are based on heuristics,
a human-based evolutionary process that has resulted in impulse and habit-based
cognitive shortcuts designed to process decisions rapidly. System 2 thinking is
thought of as being the “traditional” basis of solutions to human biases and involves
the rational and deliberate aspects of human deliberation.
The purpose of this paper was to identify and advocate a system 1
methodology that may assist in countering human biases that act as barriers to the
establishment of just cultures and effective aviation SMS systems. MINDSPACE
was identified in the research as a system comprising of nine, bias mitigation tools.
MINDSPACE may be useful within the aviation industry in reducing the amount
of human biases that impede the establishment of just culture.
Many examples could be made regarding the use of MINDSPACE within
the decision-making organizational process associated with creating a just culture.
No previous research was able to be identified that considered the use of
MINDSPACE in dealing with human biases as they pertain to aviation just culture.
The author hopes that this intentionally superficial treatment of the subject will
motivate others to conduct additional research in evaluating how system 1 cognitive
tools may positively impact just culture and overall aviation SMS function.
As the aviation industry begins to experience the changes associated with
NextGen, additional tools should be deployed, assisting in motivating human
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behavior toward safety and efficiency. MINDSPACE has proven its ability to
counter human biases in other industries and should prove helpful, not only in
benefiting just culture, but should have applications in aviation hazard and risk
identification and management.
Although MINDSPACE has been shown to successfully counter human
biases in a number of industries, this research uncovered cautionary opinions
regarding system 1 thinking. Some sources were concerned that system 1
alternatives (including MINDSPACE) artificially manipulate human behavior, is
too paternalistic and may have fleeting impacts on reduction of biases. Another
concern is that strategists must be well-trained in the application of system 1
solutions and intensely creative in the design of tools, given a particular situation
(Dolan et al., 2010).
Despite the concerns above, MINDSPACE and system 1 tools offer a
possible wide-spread humanitarian solution for bias reduction in that the approach
is not expensive and may be adopted anywhere and anytime. This potential for
widespread use offers those with lower levels of education an opportunity to
participate in solutions and the amelioration that system 1 solutions offer.
It should also be noted that no research considered by this project promoted
the sole use of system 1 or system 2 thinking as solutions excluding one another.
Most research advocated a combination of system 1 and 2 solutions as having more
noticeable and lasting impact on the totality of organizational culture (Derous et al.,
2016; Dolan et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2017).
Recommendations
The body of research collected for this project identified the role of human
biases as barriers to establishing aviation just cultures, inhibiting the effectiveness
of safety management systems. Additional research should pursue scientific studies
to more thoroughly define methodology for incorporating MINDSPACE system 1
tools into the aviation industry.
During this research, consistencies were noted between the FAA’s
discussion on human behavior in the Aviation Instructor’s Handbook (FAA, 2008)
and potential system 1 and 2 biases interventions. Additional analyses beyond this
project has the potential to explore the FAA’s research in human behavior, learning
and communication as useful information for system 1 and 2 behavioral planners
within the aviation industry.
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